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C hina is known as a society in which the government str ictly regulates news media and often 
censors public information. Inter-
national bodies routinely rank the 
country’s citizens as having the least 
freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press. However, on Internet platforms, 
such as online forums and blogs, the 
Chinese people seem to have more 
autonomy to speak on public affairs 
and can occasionally set a social agenda 
that successful ly draws media and 
public attention.1 Examples include 
the “My father is Li Gang” or “Guo Mei-
mei” incidents that were widely cov-
ered in the Western media. These cases 
support a notion that the Internet in 
China has played an overarching role 
in constructing China’s public sphere, 
empowering civil discourse, and help-
ing build the public agenda.2,3 Recently, 
China’s Twitter equivalent microblog-
ging service, weibo, has been enthu-
siastically depicted by Western media 
as a new “free speech platform.”4 This 
optimistic view is, however, challenged 
by the Chinese authorities’ ubiquitous 
mechanisms for controlling the public 
information flow, including the sophis-
ticated filtering system known as the 
Great Firewall5 and a new requirement 
that microbloggers must register with 
their real identities.6
The authors investigated the use of microblogs – or weibos – and related 
censorship practices using 111 million microblogs collected between 1 January 
and 30 June 2012. Using a matched case-control study design helped researchers 
determine a list of Chinese terms that discriminate censored and uncensored 
posts written by the same microbloggers. This list includes homophones and 
puns created by Chinese microbloggers to circumvent the censors successfully. 
The study’s design also allowed for evaluating the new real-name registration 
system’s impact on microbloggers’ posting activities. Findings suggest that this 
policy might have stopped some microbloggers from writing about social and 
political subjects.
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According to the China Internet Network 
Information Center (CNNIC),7 the total number 
of Chinese microbloggers reached 274 million 
by mid-2012, comprising 51 percent of the total 
Internet population. Currently, the two leading 
Chinese microblog platforms are Sina Weibo 
and Tencent Weibo, each of which claims more 
than 300 million registered accounts. To com-
ply with the government’s content regulations, 
all Chinese weibo service providers must estab-
lish an internal censorship department to filter 
sensitive posts.
Although a few scholars have examined cen-
sorship practices in Chinese blogs8,9 and micro-
blogs,10 their studies suffer from limitations. 
Here, we present a new approach to understand-
ing the censorship characteristics of Chinese 
microblogs and evaluate how the country’s new 
real-name registration (RnR) system is affecting 
microblogging, how often microbloggers post, 
and what they write about.
China Internet and Censorship
China’s Internet market has rapidly expanded 
over the past decade. Although still a growing 
industry, the Internet growth rate has sta-
bilized. Total Chinese Internet users reached 
538 million by mid-2012, penetrating 40 per-
cent of the country’s population.7 The country’s 
Internet penetration rate rose only 4 percent in 
2012 compared to a 9 percent average yearly 
growth since 2007. One significant shift in 
China’s online usage pattern is the exten-
sive adoption of social media applications. In 
mid-2012, one of every two Chinese “netizens” 
claimed to be a weibo user, whereas usage of tra-
ditional online tools — including email and post-
ing on online forums — has diminished.7
The Chinese government has built “the larg-
est and most sophisticated filtering systems in 
the world” to censor Internet content.5 These 
stringent measures make the Chinese Internet 
virtually an intranet, in which sensitive terms 
are filtered, and access to Western sites such 
as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube is blocked. 
However, these practices are only one aspect of 
the country’s censorship system. Another major 
part of content censorship is implemented by 
domestic Internet content providers.9 To com-
ply with their license conditions, Chinese ISPs 
must act as censors to screen customers’ mes-
sages or disable accounts. For example, Sina 
reportedly set up a censorship department of 
a thousand people to monitor weibos. In addi-
tion to filtering, social media companies also 
develop new practices to counter the dissemi-
nation of sensitive information. According to a 
media report, Sina encourages weibo users to 
report each other for releasing “untrue infor-
mation,” and the company is required to delete 
“harmful” weibos within five minutes.
Another rigorous measure — the RnR system — 
requires microbloggers to disclose their real 
identities. After trials in major Chinese cities, 
the system was officially launched on 16 March 
2012. Registered users must release their iden-
tity numbers or indirect identifiers — such as 
mobile phone numbers — to the service provider 
for government verification. Users can then 
choose to post either by nickname or real name; 
unregistered users can view posts but can’t cre-
ate content. Widespread concern exists that 
this true identity disclosure policy will have 
a chilling effect on online comments, espe-
cially on political criticism and other sensitive 
topics.
Our Approach
We developed a data collection and visualization 
system called Weiboscope. To access the micro-
blog data, we use the Sina Weibo Open API. We 
first constructed a list of popular microbloggers — 
those who have 1,000 or more followers — 
based on the User Search API. Systematically 
searching for these users in each region of China 
beginning in late 2010 and continuing through-
out the study period gave us a list of about 
350,000 microbloggers. We collected user posts 
through the User Timeline API function and 
then saved them in our PostgreSQL database. 
Our selection of high-follower-count samples 
can minimize the number of spam accounts in 
our data. Between 1 January 2012 and 30 June 
2012, our system collected 111 million weibos.
Because the Chinese censor mechanism can 
remove posts swiftly, we must revisit the user 
timeline frequently enough to save as many 
copies of posts as possible before they’re cen-
sored. However, because API use is subject to a 
per-hour rate limitation, we had to restrict the 
API calls to a list of prioritized users. We cre-
ated three prioritized groups with various sam-
pling frequencies: 
•	 Group 1 consisted of fewer than 10 China 
Media Project researchers at the University 
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of Hong Kong who are scholars and active 
writers on the Chinese media industry. We 
checked and updated Group 1’s timelines 
every three minutes.
•	 Group 2 consisted of fr iends of Group 1 
users; these are most ly Chinese dissi-
dent writers, journalists, and scholars. We 
updated this group’s members automati-
cally by adding users whose posts had been 
deleted. Group 2 consisted of about 5,000 
users and was updated every six hours.
•	 Group 3 consisted of users with an authen-
ticated, or VIP, status and more than 10,000 
followers. This group had approximately 
38,000 users and was updated once a day.
Af ter each user’s t imeline was fetched, 
the user’s recent ly modif ied t imeline was 
compared to the immediately previous version. 
If posts were missing in the new copy compared 
with the old copy, we found the missing posts 
and verified their absence by another API call 
before label ing them as missing. A weibo 
marked as missing comes with two potential 
messages from the API: “weibo does not exist” 
or “permission denied.” Although Sina doesn’t 
explicitly say what each message carried for 
the post they are marked with, we reverse engi-
neered their empirical meaning. We tested the 
returned messages based on known causes of 
deletion and verified them via repeated trials. 
This approach yielded circumstantial evidence 
that posts missing for various reasons are 
marked differently. If the API response is “per-
mission denied,” the censor sets the post to be 
inaccessible to other users; we assume this 
because Sina doesn’t allow a user setting to 
block outsider access. Posts that the user volun-
tarily deletes or the censor removes entirely are 
marked “weibo does not exist.” Because no fea-
sible method exists for determining who deleted 
a post, we excluded deleted posts to avoid con-
tamination of the truly censored weibos.
An Example
To show how the system works, we’ll use a real 
example. Blogger H is a famous scholar and 
writer in China. Followed by 181,000 readers, 
he writes regularly on social topics in China, 
and his microblog posts are — as expected — 
often censored. In our study, Blogger H belongs 
to Group 3, so we check his timeline every day.
On 2 May 2012, the blind Chinese activist 
Chen Guangcheng was confirmed to be seek-
ing protection from the US Embassy in Beijing. 
Chinese authorities demanded an apology from 
US off icials for the incident, and Blogger H 
posted a comment. 
Figure 1a shows how this weibo was posted, 
diffused, and finally censored. The post was 
created by Blogger H at 18:46 on 2 May. Our 
system updated his timeline and saved the copy 
Figure 1. Example findings from the Weiboscope data collection and visualization system. (a) A graphic 
tracking Blogger H’s original weibo post, diffusion, and censorship. (b) A repost graph shows that 
reposts were primarily diffused via the Internet space by a few microbloggers with many followers 
(node size is proportional to the microblogger’s number of followers).
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of his post at 19:41. The next day, we detected 
“permission denied” from the API and confirmed 
the post’s disappearance at 6:01 on 3 May. As 
Figure 1a shows, the hourly repost count was 
drastically reduced between 20:07 and 20:16 on 
2 May, which appears to be the time that the 
original post was censored.
We then deployed Sina’s Repost Timeline API 
to retrieve the whole retweeted set. The origi-
nal weibo was reposted a total of 6,800 times 
by 6,193 distinct microbloggers in 1.5 hours. 
To study its diffusion, we generated the repost 
graph (Figure 1b) in which each node represents 
a microblogger, and an arrow denotes a retweet. 
Node size is proportional to the number of a 
microblogger’s followers. We extracted the user 
mentions contained in the repost contents, in 
the format of “//@username,” which showed the 
immediate source of repost, assuming that this 
default text isn’t usually deleted by the user. 
As Figure 1b shows, the reposts were primarily 
diffused via the Internet space by a few micro-
bloggers with many followers.
Analyzing Censored Keywords
To study the Chinese terms that lead to a higher 
likelihood of censorship, we included all “per-
mission denied” posts captured from 1 January 
2012 to 30 June 2012 in this par t of the 
analysis.
To control for the influence of individual 
microbloggers’ characteristics, we deployed 
a case-control matching strategy, which is a 
common observational study design used in 
epidemiology and social science, and is par-
ticularly useful when researching a topic for 
which implementing a randomized controlled 
experiment is infeasible. We paired each cen-
sored post with two randomly selected uncen-
sored posts published by the same microblogger 
during the study period to construct a corpus 
of matching censored and uncensored micro-
blog posts.
We used the Stanford Word Segmenter to 
undertake Chinese word segmentation for each 
document in the corpus.11 We then removed 
stopwords, punctuation, emoticons, URLs, and 
“@usernames” (addressing a user) from the 
text. Using R12 and its supported libraries, we 
tokenized each document in the corpus using the 
bigram tokenizer and generated a document- 
term matrix with inverse-document frequency 
we ight ing .  We r emoved te rms w it h low 
frequency (fewer than five occurrences) from 
the document-term matrix.
We used the χ² feature selection algorithm13 
to compare the relative frequency of each key-
word occurrence in two distinct sets of posts. 
Keywords with higher χ² value represent a 
greater discriminatory ability than all others. 
We further deployed a relative risk (RR) mea-
sure to determine which terms can characterize 
censored posts — that is to say, RR > 1.
 
 
RR
Frequencyof occurrence in censored posts .5
Frequencyof occurrence in uncensored posts .5
=
+
+
We captured a total of 17,594 censored posts, 
submitted by 4,667 distinct microbloggers, dur-
ing the study period. These posts were indi-
vidually matched with 35,184 uncensored posts. 
Two posts weren’t matched because one micro-
blogger didn’t have enough uncensored posts for 
one-to-two matching. Table 1 shows the top 30 
keywords with the highest χ² value and RR > 1. 
(The full list is available online at http://tinyurl 
.com/hkuweibokeywords). These keywords were 
mostly related to the Bo Xilai scandal, the 
Chen Guangcheng diplomatic incident, the US 
Ambassador to China Gary Locke’s finance dis-
closure, the one-child policy, housing policy, 
and the pension system. Other major keywords 
included political terms: “two meetings” (两会, 
the two annual meetings that make national-
level political decisions), National People’s 
Congress (人大代表), leaders in the Commu-
nist Party (书记), officials (官), refuting rumors 
(辟谣), content deletion (删), and profanity.
Furthermore, we discovered many terms 
that Chinese microbloggers created to circum-
vent the censors. Examples include
•	 “Pingxi Wang” (平西王), literally the “King 
who pacifies the west” in reference to Bo Xilai;
•	 “CGC” (the initials of Chen Guangcheng);
•	 “crown prince” (储君), referring to Xi Jin-
ping, China’s new leader; and
•	 “grass” (艹), an obscure alternative writing 
of 草, a homophone of a vulgar word. 
We also uncovered “sensitive” terms that 
have lower discriminatory power, meaning they 
had higher survival rates for censorship cir-
cumvention. Examples here included “tomato” 
(西红柿) for “western red city,” referring to 
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Chongqing; and “head nurse” (护士长), refer-
ring to Wang Lijun, a key figure in the Bo Xilai 
scandal.
Evaluating the Impact  
of Real-Name Registration
To evaluate RnR’s impact, we defined
•	 T1 as the period between 8 December 2011 
and 15 March 2012 — that is, the 99 days 
before the enforcement of the RnR scheme in 
China; and
•	 T2 as the period between 16 March 2012 and 
22 June 2012 — that is, the 99 days after 
RnR enforcement.
In all, we included 166,725 microbloggers who 
posted at least one weibo during T1. We cal-
culated the total number of posts submitted in 
T1 and T2 for each sample. Those who made 
no posts during T2 were defined as potentially 
affected microbloggers (PAMs). We hypoth-
esized that their reduced user activity was 
largely attributable to RnR’s chilling effect.
Table 1. Top 30 keywords for censorship and potentially affected microblogger (PAM) status according to χ² value.*
Rank
Predictors for Censorship Predictors for PAMs
Terms χ² RR Terms χ² RR
1 重庆 (Chungking) 302.38 3.25 两会 (two meetings) 75.88 5.67
2 光诚 (Guangcheng) 248.62 32.82 雷 锋 (Lei Feng) 56.66 3.41
3 陈 光诚 (Chen Guangcheng) 237.42 46.72 白色 情人节 (White Day) 37.07 5.86
4 两会 (two meetings) 232.29 5.39 人大代 表 (National People’s Congress) 33.48 3.14
5 骆家辉 (Gary Locke) 212.82 12.38 情人节 (Valentine’s Day) 30.66 1.42
6 辟谣 (refuting rumors) 203.14 5.16 王 立军 (Wang Lijun) 30.57 4.91
7 代表 (representative) 200.1 2.75 立军 (Lijun) 30.57 4.91
8 薄 (Bo, a family name) 187.26 5.07 锋 (Feng) 27.7 1.87
9 日报 (daily newspaper) 179.82 4.21 妇女节 (Women’s Day) 24.97 3.61
10 公布 财产 (announced assets) 178.93 24.59 Bed (the English word) 22.26 2.01
11 北京 日报 (Beijing Daily) 172.05 7.91 民主 (democracy) 22.05 1.92
12 薄熙来 (Bo Xilai) 159.18 7.01 三八 (March 8) 22.04 2.56
13 人大代表  (National People’s Congress) 152.5 4.23 Bed 凌乱 (messy) 21.96 3.74
14 骆家辉公布 (Gary Locke, announced) 152.2 305.96 学 雷 (learn, Lei) 21.68 3.36
15 财产 (assets) 150.95 3.86 吴英 (Wu Ying) 21.52 5.13
16 转发 (retweet) 146.52 1.34 叙利亚 (Syria) 20.65 5.46
17 转 (retweet) 144.09 1.81 方舟子 (Fang Zhozi) 19.92 2.35
18 王立军 (Wang Lijun) 134.24 4.18 吴 英案 (Wu Ying’s case) 19.68 10.2
19 求证 (seeking confirmation) 127.34 4.56 英案 (Ying’s case) 19.68 10.2
20 转发 微博 (retweet, weibo) 126.49 1.34 315 19.51 3.11
21 请 骆家辉 (asking, Gary Locke) 126.14 253.97 市长 (mayor) 19.33 2.09
22 书记 (secretary) 124.51 2.87 的意料 (expectation of) 19.24 2.95
23 转 么 (retweet) 122.13 245.97 代表委员 (representative member) 19.04 6.56
24 鬼子 转 (little devil, retweet) 122.13 245.97 出乎 的 (exceed someone) 19.03 2.81
25 公布 (announced) 120.01 2.86 文革 (Cultural Revolution) 18.48 2.9
26 求 辟谣 (seeking refutation) 110.06 7.33 三八节 (March 8 Festival) 18.29 3.7
27 删 (deleted) 108.53 2.97 公知 (public intellectual) 18.29 3.7
28 陈 (Chen, a family name) 106.82 2.2 两会 期间 (two meetings, duration) 18.05 37
29 微博 (Weibo) 104.57 1.26 党 (party) 17.97 1.63
30 养老不 (social security for the elderly 
and “don’t”)
100.08 201.97 临时工 (temporary job) 17.95 4.29
*Keywords in red are in both lists.
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First, we conducted aggregate-level ana-
lysis. Figure 2 plots the daily frequency of 
posts and features three sharp drops: one 
before the Lunar New Year, another imme-
diately following 16 March, and the third on 
20 April (linked to an Internet crackdown). The 
volume of posts appeared to decrease gradu-
ally after 16 March for roughly 30 days and 
then bounced up. The pattern might be linked 
to RnR enforcement. But , on 15 March, Bo 
Xi la i was ousted , which would st imulate 
more censorship. Nevertheless, we undertook 
an autoregressive integrated moving average 
(ARIMA) time-series analysis and found the 
drop between 16 March and 21 April was sta-
tistically insignificant.
We reexamined the question using logis-
tic regression for individual-level analysis. 
Finding predictors for PAM — including user 
characteristics and T1 post keywords — can 
shed light on the mechanism for the reduced 
activity. The dependent variable was the PAM 
status. The independent variables included 
number of followers, number of friends, VIP 
status, whether the user let others comment, 
self-reported gender, and self-reported geo-
graphic location. Microbloggers who reportedly 
originated from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, or 
“other” were categorized as being from non-
RnR regions. Independent variables with an 
adjusted odds ratio (AOR) significantly larger 
or smaller than 1 at a 5-percent level were 
declared significant independent predictors of 
PAM status.
We identified 57,155 PAMs (34.3 percent of 
166,725) who didn’t post during T2. The statis-
tically significant PAM predictors — sorted by 
effect size, in descending order — follow here; 
“CI” stands for “confidence interval.”
•	 Claiming to have or iginated from RnR 
regions — AOR: 2.124; 95 percent CI: 2.051 
to 2.201.
•	 Non-VIP — AOR: 1.725; 95 percent CI: 1.772 
to 1.820.
•	 Allowing anyone to comment on timeline — 
AOR: 1.730; 95 percent CI: 1.645 to 1.819.
•	 Female — AOR: 1.051; 95 percent CI: 1.027 
to 1.075.
•	 Every reduct ion of 100 fr iends — AOR: 
1.010; 95 percent CI: 1.008 to 1.012.
•	 Every reduction of 100 followers — AOR: 
1.002; 95 percent CI: 1.001 to 1.003.
We then identified the Chinese terms in the 
microblogs created during T1 that were asso-
ciated with PAM status. To adjust for the con-
founders of PAM status — such as personal 
characteristics or personal reasons — we used 
a case-control matching strategy. We paired 
each PAM with a matching non-PAM, using the 
same status in terms of gender, province, VIP, 
and allowing microbloggers’ comments. Two 
additional criteria for matching were set to select 
those whose followers count and friends count 
are within plus or minus 30 percent ranges and 
whose frequency of microblog posts counted in 
T1 fell within the 50 to 200 percent range. If 
multiple matched non-PAMs were identified, 
we selected the one with the maximum ratio of 
sustained user activity — that is, a post count 
in T2 divided by the post count in T1. We dis-
carded PAMs without matches. We eventually 
assembled a group with an equal number of 
PAMs and non-PAMs with similar group-wise 
characteristics.
We randomly selected 3,000 PAMs from all 
microbloggers who claimed to originate from 
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, and Tianjin, 
which were the officially announced trial cities 
Figure 2. The daily posting frequency of 166,725 microbloggers 
indicates a gradual decrease in number of posts after 16 March 
for roughly 30 days and then a rebound. However, a time series  
analysis reveals that the rise and drop were statistically insignificant.
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for enforcing the RnR. We then generated 3,000 
matched non-PAMs. We retrieved all of their 
weibos posted in T1 (totaling 437,153 posts) to 
analyze terms associated with PAM status. We 
processed the text of the corpus as previously 
described. Table 1 shows a list of keywords with 
high discriminatory power for PAM status — 
that is, the top 30 terms as ranked by χ² value 
and RR > 1.
Among all top keywords with RR > 1, most 
connotatively referred to political scandals, 
international affairs, social events, or figures. 
Examples include “two meetings,” Lei Feng 
(雷锋), Wang Lijun (王立军), Wu Ying (吴英, a 
businesswoman convicted of financial fraud 
and sentenced to death), Syria (叙利亚), Cultural 
Revolution (文革), Wukan (乌坎 , a village where 
an anti-corruption protest took place), Article 73 
(73 条, new legislation allowing authorities to 
detain any parties suspected of national secu-
rity threats), and corruption (腐败).
So, despite an absence of evidence of signifi-
cant changes in overall activity following RnR, 
when we compared microbloggers who didn’t post 
after the RnR to those who posted as usual by 
scrutinizing the contents they published before 
the RnR, we discovered that the best discrimi-
natory terms between two groups were mostly 
related to political and social issues. We there-
fore suspected that, if the RnR weren’t enforced, 
some PAMs would have posted weibos related 
to politics as usual after the RnR. Although the 
RnR’s impact can’t be observed ecologically, it 
might exert a chilling effect selectively on some 
microbloggers who are characterized as
•	 stationed inside mainland China, with a 
non-authenticated identity;
•	 welcoming other microbloggers to comment 
(stimulating public debate); and
•	 having a smaller online social network 
(likely grassroots citizens with fewer follow-
ers and friends).
RnR might cause these microbloggers to 
stop writing on sensitive issues using the same 
account, though we can’t completely rule out 
their changing accounts and continuing to post. 
These findings should be considered preliminary; 
further study over a longer term is needed before 
we can draw conclusions, especially given that 
the Chinese government has recently announced 
additional requirements for the RnR.6
R eaders should cautiously interpret our find-ings. Our samples were col lec ted f rom 
350,000 high-follower-count microbloggers, 
which constitute a small percentage of the 
overall microblogger population. Despite their 
ability to diffuse information, our f indings 
can’t be overly generalized to all microbloggers. 
Nevertheless, we don’t expect a signif icant 
change in results when sampling users with 
fewer followers. Another study found that a 
small number of high-follower-count Chinese 
microbloggers contr ibute a major ity of the 
posts and draw the most at tent ion.14 Thus 
high-follower-count users should be deemed 
representative.
Our system also can’t detect the complete set 
of deleted posts, especially the rapidly censored 
ones. Moreover, the abandonment of microblog-
ging might be attributable to factors other than 
the RnR chilling effect. Given that no study 
exists on the reasons for abandoning micro-
blogging under censorship, we suggest future 
studies to interview users about their practices 
before and after the policy change.
Despite the fact that China is an authoritarian 
state and the contexts are totally different, our 
results have global implications: recently, some 
international social media companies — including 
YouTube and Google — have expressed interest 
in forcing their users to disclose real names to 
minimize trolling.
The social media industry in China is 
dynamic, and new technologies emerge every 
few years. WeChat, for example, is a popular 
mobile messaging application that has become a 
new superstar of social media in China; it cur-
rently claims to have more than 300-million 
accounts. Future work is crucially needed to 
study new social media applications in China, 
investigating their development and social 
impact as well as the Chinese government’s 
evolving censorship policy. 
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that Chinese authorities can tolerate posts that write on a 
wide range of criticism of the Chinese government and its poli-
cies, but tend to be more sensitive to censoring the spread of 
posts that might lead to collective action. However, their study 
didn’t cover weibos.
also in 2011, David Bamman, Brendan O’Connor, and Noah 
a. Smith gathered 56 million posts using Sina’s public timeline 
aPI. They then checked a random sample of 1.3 million weibos, of 
which 212,583 were deleted, suggesting an overall message dele-
tion rate of 16.25 percent.2 Using Chinese posts on Twitter as a 
comparison group, the authors constructed a list of politically sen-
sitive keywords that had a higher probability of being censored.
However, a few limitations in these studies could threaten 
the findings’ validity. The first issue is the omnipresence of spam 
and fake accounts in the Chinese microblog space. Sina Weibo 
carries a huge amount of spam, which artificially inflates Internet 
traffic.3 Even when researchers deployed spam removal proce-
dures, the most frequent censored terms were still dominated 
by spam.2
The second issue is the influence of individual user charac-
teristics that might confound the results. Many Chinese Inter-
net accounts are selectively monitored4 – reportedly, this is 
done manually by weibo providers’ “editors.” Censorship deci-
sions can target microbloggers who have specific attributes; in 
the Chinese context, the typical targets are dissidents, journal-
ists, scholars, and rights-activists. Therefore, simply comparing 
terms between censored and uncensored sets doesn’t neces-
sarily disentangle the influence from individual characteristics. 
So, rather than address the question of what topics or terms 
in general are more likely to be censored, we reframe the 
question: When posts are made by the same person, why are some 
posts censored but others not censored? What are the terms that 
characterize the censorship decision?
The third limitation here is the definition of Chinese terms. 
Chinese text doesn’t use space to separate terms. Rather than 
using a tool to chop Chinese documents into terms for analysis, 
both studies sampled the data corpus by searching predefined 
sets of dictionary terms, – sourced, for example, from an open 
source Chinese-English dictionary and Chinese Wikipedia2 – 
or self-devised lists of sensitive Chinese terms.1 However, in 
the context of China, sensitive topics or names are commonly 
represented by puns, homophones, or special combinations of 
written Chinese characters that don’t appear in dictionaries. 
Research studies that impose a predetermined list of Chinese 
terms might fail to correctly identify the user-generated terms 
and thus limit the scope of their findings.
True-Identity Policies
Social science research has long shown that people consider 
conformity pressures or possible punishments when voicing 
their opinions.5 Since real-name registration has been in force, 
microbloggers must register their true identities and thus no 
longer have the anonymity that they once enjoyed. This could 
discourage them from making critical posts due to fear of 
punishments – including arrest and imprisonment – which aren’t 
uncommon in China.
South Korea was the first country to enact regulations 
requiring the use of real identities on the Internet.6 an evalu-
ation study aimed at assessing that policy’s impact confirmed a 
significant reduction in uninhibited behaviors at the aggregate 
level. In that study, the primary impact was seen among light 
users, while the behavior of heavy users seemed unchanged.6
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